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By generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases, this paper
develops a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value. We charac-
terize the consensus value as the unique function that satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the
quasi dummy property and additivity. By means of the transfer property, a second charac-
terization is provided. By de¯ning the stand-alone reduced game, a recursive formula for
the value is established. We also show that this value is the average of the Shapley value
and the equal surplus solution. Furthermore, we discuss a possible generalization.
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In this paper, we study the problem of sharing the joint gains of cooperation and try to
¯nd a solution concept which can not only be axiomatically characterized but which is
also constructive (based on an explicit process of sharing gains of cooperation). Following
a simple and natural way of generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into
n-person cases, we obtain a new solution concept for TU (transferable utility) games: the
consensus value.
The consensus value is related to two well established solution concepts: the equal
surplus solution (cf. Moulin (2003)) and the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)).
The equal surplus solution, also known as the CIS-value (Driessen and Funaki (1991),
van den Brink and Funaki (2003)), assigns to every player her individual value, and dis-
tributes the remainder of the value of the grand coalition equally among all players. Thus,
the equal surplus solution is a central solution concept in terms of egalitarianism. More-
over, it is particularly useful for a class of games where the only possible ¯nal outcomes
are either the complete cooperation of all players or the complete breakdown of cooper-
ation1. However, since the equal surplus solution rules out the consideration on partial
cooperation, it fails to explain the interaction between coalitions and leaves the evolution
process from complete breakdown to complete cooperation as a blackbox. Consequently,
this solution concept seems insu±cient for general n-person cooperative games but could
well serve as a speci¯c benchmark.
The Shapley value, on the other hand, takes all coalitional values into account and some-
how corresponds to the players' expected marginal contributions. Moreover, the Shapley
value is characterized as the unique function that satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the dummy
property and additivity. Although the Shapley value serves as the central solution con-
cept for TU games, there is still critique. For instance, Luce and Rai®a (1957) criticize
the e±ciency postulate and the additivity postulate. A recent critique on the e±ciency
postulate can be found in Maskin (2003). In our paper, the justi¯cation of the dummy
property is considered. Generally speaking, there may exist two extreme opinions about
the gain of a dummy player. From the individualist point of view, we do get the classical
dummy property requiring that no more value is allocated to a dummy player than her own
value v(fig). However, from the egalitarian or collectivistic perspective, one can argue that
all members of a society including dummies should share the joint surplus equally among
them. This distinction opens up the possibility to relax this postulate. In this spirit we
1Another possible interpretation could be that we only have information about the two extreme ends
of a game: the individual values and the value of the grand coalition; or simply when we do not care about
partial cooperation.
1introduce and discuss a so-called quasi dummy property.
In addition, in our opinion, the constructive interpretation of the Shapley value, i.e., the
marginal contribution approach, is not so convincing. Here, the terminology of \marginal
contribution" is somewhat misleading. In fact, the marginal contribution is jointly created
by the existing coalition of players and the entrant, but not by the entrant solely. Following
this reasoning, it seems too much to give a later entrant the whole marginal value in
superadditive games. Similarly, this rule is hard to implement if the marginal contribution
is less than the entrant's individual value if the loss is caused by the interaction between
the entrant and the incumbents. Of course, those aspects are smoothed out in some sense
by taking the average of the marginal contributions over all di®erent orders.
Although basically we follow the same line as the Shapley value to study the problem of
sharing gains of cooperation, i.e., using an average serial method, we propose to replace the
allocation of marginal contributions by a method which is based on the standard solution
for 2-person games. Given an ordering of players, we take a bilateral perspective and
consider that any surplus is the joint contribution between an existing coalition of players
(i.e., the incumbents) and an entrant. By taking the incumbents as one party and the
entrant as a second party, the standard solution for 2-person games can be applied all
the way with consensus. That is, all the joint surpluses are always equally split between
the corresponding two parties. Since no speci¯c ordering is pre-determined, we average
over all possible permutations. Such a constructive process is helpful to solve practical
problems. Ju, Ruys and Borm (2004) apply it to study loss compensation and surplus
sharing problems in project-allocation situations.
We characterize the consensus value as the unique one-point solution concept for TU
games that satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity. By
means of the transfer property, an alternative characterization for the consensus value is
provided. We also establish a recursive formula for the consensus value by de¯ning a stand-
alone reduced game. Moreover, surprisingly, we ¯nd that the consensus value is the average
of the Shapley value and the equal surplus solution. Furthermore, by introducing a share
parameter on the splitting of joint surpluses, we obtain a generalization of the consensus
value. In particular, the Shapley value and the equal surplus solution are the two polar
cases of these generalized consensus values.
In addition to this section introducing the paper and reviewing the seminal works brie°y,
the remaining part has the following structure. In the next section, we formally de¯ne the
consensus value and establish a recursive formula. As an illustration we consider glove
games. In section 3, we characterize the consensus value in an axiomatic way and discuss
2the properties under consideration. Moreover, it is shown that the consensus value is the
average of the Shapley value and the equal surplus solution. An alternative characterization
using the transfer property is provided. Generalizations are discussed in the ¯nal section.
2 The consensus value
Let us consider an arbitrary 2-person cooperative TU game with player set N = f1;2g
and characteristic function v determined by the values: v(f1g), v(f2g) and v(f1;2g). A
reasonable solution is that player 1 gets
v(f1g) +
v(f1;2g) ¡ v(f1g) ¡ v(f2g)
2
and player 2 gets
v(f2g) +
v(f1;2g) ¡ v(f2g) ¡ v(f1g)
2
:
That is, the (net) surplus generated by the cooperation between player 1 and 2, v(f1;2g)¡
v(f1g) ¡ v(f2g), is equally shared between the two players. This solution is called the
standard solution for 2-person cooperative games.
Now, we provide a generalization of the standard solution for 2-person games into
n-person cases. It follows the following line of reasoning.
Consider a 3-person game (N;v) with player set N = f1;2;3g. Assume we have the
order (1;2;3): player 1 shows up ¯rst, then player 2, and ¯nally player 3. When player
2 joins player 1, we in fact have a 2-person situation, and following the principles of the
standard solution, the surplus v(f1;2g)¡v(f1g)¡v(f2g) will be equally split among them.
Next player 3 enters the scene, who would like to cooperate with player 1 and 2. Because
coalition f1;2g has already been formed before she enters the game, player 3 will actually
cooperate with the existing coalition f1;2g instead of simply cooperating with 1 and 2
individually. If f1;2g agrees to cooperate with 3 as well, the coalitional value v(f1;2;3g)
will be generated. Now, the question is how to share it?
Again, following the standard solution to 2-person games, one can argue that both
parties should get half of the joint surplus v(f1;2;3g) ¡ v(f1;2g) ¡ v(f3g) in addition to
their individual values. The reason is simple: coalition f1;2g can be regarded as one player
instead of two players because they have already formed a cooperating coalition. Internally,
1 and 2 will receive equal shares of the surplus because this part is obtained extra by the
coalition f1;2g cooperating with coalition f3g.
One can also tell this story in the reverse way, yielding the same outcome in terms
of surplus sharing. Initially, three players cooperate with each other and v(f1;2;3g) is
3obtained. We now consider players leaving the existing coalition one by one in the opposite
order (3;2;1). So, player 3 leaves ¯rst. By the standard solution for 2-person games, player
3 should get half of the joint surplus/loss plus her individual payo®, i.e.,
v(f3g) +
v(f1;2;3g) ¡ v(f3g) ¡ v(f1;2g)
2
;
as 1 and 2 remain as one cooperating coalition f1;2g. Thus, the value left for coalition
f1;2g, which we call the standardized remainder (the value left for the corresponding
remaining coalition) for f1;2g, is
v(f1;2g) +
v(f1;2;3g) ¡ v(f1;2g) ¡ v(f3g)
2
:







¡ v(f1g) ¡ v(f2g)
2
when player 2 leaves the coalition f1;2g next.
Extending this argument to an n-person case, we obtain a general method, which can
be understood as a standardized remainder rule since we take the later entrant (or earlier
leaver) and all her pre-entrants (or post-leavers) as two parties and apply the standard
solution for 2-person games all the way. Furthermore, since no ordering is pre-determined
for a TU game, we will average over all possible orderings.
Formal de¯nitions are provided below. We denote by TUN the class of all TU games
with player set N. Let ¦(N) be the set of all bijections ¾ : f1;2;:::;jNjg ¡! N. For
a given ¾ 2 ¦(N) and k 2 f1;2;:::;jNjg we de¯ne S¾
k = f¾(1);¾(2);:::;¾(k)g ½ N and
S¾












k) ¡ v(f¾(k + 1)g)
¢
if k 2 f1;:::;jNj ¡ 1g
where r(S¾
k) is the standardized remainder for coalition S¾
k: the value left for S¾
k after
allocating surpluses to earlier leavers NnS¾
k.
We then construct the individual standardized remainder vector s¾(v), which cor-
responds to the situation where the players leave the game one by one in the order
(¾(jNj);¾(jNj ¡ 1);:::;¾(1)) and assign to each player ¾(k), besides her individual payo®













if k 2 f2;:::;jNjg
r(S¾
1) if k = 1
De¯nition 2.1 For every v 2 TUN, the consensus value °(v) is de¯ned as the average of








Hence, the consensus value can be interpreted as the expected individual standardized
remainder a player can get by participating in coalitions.
Following the process of obtaining the consensus value, a more descriptive name for
this solution concept could be the average serial standardized remainder value2.
Example 2.2 Consider the 3-person TU game described below.
S f1g f2g f3g f12g f13g f23g f123g
v(S) 10 0 0 18 23 0 30
With ¾ : f1;2;3g ¡! N de¯ned by ¾(1) = 2, ¾(2) = 1 and ¾(3) = 3, which is shortly





¾(3)(v)) = v(f3g) +
1
2





¾(2)(v)) = v(f1g) +
1
2





¾(1)(v)) = r(f2g) = v(f2g) +
1
2
(r(f2;1g) ¡ v(f2g) ¡ v(f1g)) = 7:










(213) 17 7 6





















2In the same spirit, an alternative name for the Shapley value could be the average serial marginal
contribution value.
3The fact that two permutations like (123) and (213) yield the same payo® vector only holds for the
class of all 3-person TU games.
5To further illustrate the consensus value, we consider glove games.
Example 2.3 (A glove game)
Let N = f1;2;3g be the set of players. Player 1 has one left hand glove. Player 2 and
3 have one right hand glove each. A single glove is worth nothing. A (left-right) pair is
worth 1 Euro. The corresponding TU game (N;v) is determined by the values: v(fig) = 0
for all i in N, v(f2;3g) = 0, and v(f1;2g) = v(f1;3g) = v(f1;2;3g) = 1.








In the more general case where jNj > 3 but there still only one left hand glove player
while all the others have one right hand glove each, the consensus value yields that the left
hand glove player gets 1
2 and each right hand glove player gets 1
2(jNj¡1).
Next it is shown that the consensus value satis¯es the basic property of relative invari-
ance with respect to strategic equivalence.
Lemma 2.4 The consensus value ° is relative invariant with respect to strategic equiva-
lence, i.e., for ® > 0 and ¯ 2 RN, we have
°i(®v + ¯) = ®°i(v) + ¯i
for all i 2 N and v 2 TUN.






k ¯i for all k 2 f1;2;:::;jNjg.
For k = jNj, this is obvious.




































































¾(k)(®v + ¯) = ®s¾
¾(k)(v) + ¯¾(k) for all k 2 f1;2;:::;jNjg.

















































For k = 1, this is obvious.
From claim 1 and claim 2 it immediately follows that
°i(®v + ¯) = ®°i(v) + ¯i
for all i 2 N.
The consensus value can be reformulated by means of a recursive formula, adopting the
same technique as in the paper by O'Neill (1982) for the so-called Run to the Bank rule.
Formally, let f : TUN ¡! RN be a solution concept. For (N;v) 2 TUN and i 2 N, we




v(S) if S $ Nnfig
v(Nnfig) +
v(N)¡v(Nnfig)¡v(fig)
2 if S = Nnfig
and call v¡i the stand-alone reduced game of (N;v) with respect to player i.
We say that a solution concept f satis¯es stand-alone recursion if for every game




















for all i 2 N.
One can readily check that the consensus value is the unique one-point solution concept
on the class of all n-person TU games with n ¸ 2 which is standard for 2-person games
and satis¯es stand-alone recursion.
73 Characterizations
Let f : TUN ¡! RN be a one-point solution concept. We consider the following properties.
² E±ciency:
P
i2N fi(v) = v(N) for all v 2 TUN;
² Symmetry: for two players i;j 2 N, if v(S [fig) = v(S [fjg) for any S ½ Nnfi;jg,
then fi(v) = fj(v) for all v 2 TUN;
² The quasi dummy property: if for some player i 2 N, v(S [ fig) = v(S) + v(fig) for










for all v 2 TUN;
² Additivity: f(v + w) = f(v) + f(w) for all v;w 2 TUN.
The properties of e±ciency, symmetry, and additivity are clear by themselves. The
quasi dummy property is a modi¯cation of the classical dummy property.
As is argued in the introduction, the classical dummy property is utilitarianism oriented,
or, put di®erently, individualism oriented. However, from the egalitarian point of view or
from the collectivistic perspective, one can argue that all members of a society including
dummies should share the joint surplus equally among them. Thus, assigning a dummy




jNj can be viewed as consequences of two
contrastive viewpoints. Concerning the tradeo® between these two extreme cases4, we
make a fair compromise and take the average as the gain of a dummy player, which results
in the so-called quasi dummy property.
We show that the consensus value is the unique one-point solution concept that satis¯es
these four properties.
Theorem 3.1 Let f : TUN ¡! RN. Then, f equals the consensus value if and only if it
satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity.
Proof.
We ¯rst show that the consensus value satis¯es those four properties.
(i) E±ciency is obvious since, by construction, s¾(v) is e±cient for all ¾ 2 ¦(N).
(ii) Now, let us check symmetry. Let i;j be two symmetric players in v 2 TUN. Consider
¾ 2 ¦(N), and set, without loss of generality, ¾(k) = i, ¾(l) = j, where k;l 2 f1;:::;jNjg.
Let ¹ ¾ 2 ¦(N) be the permutation which is obtained from ¾ by interchanging the positions





¾(m) if m 6= k;l
i if m = l
j if m = k
4Cultural and philosophical factors may a®ect the propensity or choice between the two polar opinions.
8As ¾ 7! ¹ ¾ is bijective, it su±ces to prove that s¾
i (v) = s¹ ¾
j(v).
Case 1: 1 < k < l.
By de¯nition, we know
s
¾
i (v) = s
¾






















k¡1) ¡ v(f¹ ¾(k)g)
¢
Note that, v(f¾(k)g) = v(fig) = v(fjg) = v(f¹ ¾(k)g), S¾
k¡1 = S¹ ¾
k¡1, and thus v(S¾
k¡1) =
v(S¹ ¾
k¡1). It remains to show that r(S¾
k) = r(S¹ ¾
k).
Clearly, r(S¾
m) = r(S¹ ¾
m) for m ¸ l. By induction, we can show that r(S¾
l¡t) = r(S¹ ¾
l¡t) for




























l¡t) ¡ v(f¹ ¾(l ¡ t + 1)g)
¢
:
Here, we also use the fact that ¾(fl ¡tg) = ¹ ¾(fl ¡tg). Moreover, S¾
l¡tnfig = S¹ ¾
l¡tnfjg, we
know that v(S¾
l¡t) = v(S¹ ¾
l¡t).






























Case 2: 1 < l < k. The proof is analogous to Case 1.













¹ ¾(1)(v) = r(S
¹ ¾
1)
What remains is identical to Case 1.
Case 4: 1 = l < k. Analogously to Case 3.
(iii) As for additivity, it is immediate to see that s¾
¾(i)(v + w) = s¾
¾(i)(v) + s¾
¾(i)(w) for all
v;w 2 TUN and for all i 2 f1;2;:::;jNjg.
(iv) By relative invariance with respect to strategic equivalence (Lemma 2.4), it su±ces to
9prove that the consensus value ° satis¯es the quasi dummy property for zero-normalized






























































































l ) if k = 1
Let i 2 N be a dummy player in v. Let ¾(k) = i. Then,
s
¾











if k ¸ 2
r(S¾
1) if k = 1









































































































































10And a general expression is
s
¾












l ) ¡ 1
2v(S¾






l ) if k = 1
Consider a class P of jNj permutations ¾ 2 ¦(N) such that for ¾;¿ 2 P it holds that for






That is, given an ordering of the players Nnfig, let the dummy player i move from the end
to the beginning without changing the other players' relative positions. Summing over the
















































Conversely, let f : TUN ¡! RN satisfy e±ciency, symmetry, and the quasi dummy
property. It easily follows that f is uniquely determined for (multiples of) unanimity
games. Hence requiring a solution f to be additive too, it follows that f is uniquely de-
termined for any game in TUN, since the class of unanimity games f(N;uT)jT 2 2Nnf;gg
constitutes a basis of TUN.
Note that the quasi dummy property can be reformulated as fi(v) = 1
2©i(v)+ 1
2Ei(v) for
all v 2 TUN and every dummy player i in v. Here, ©(v) is the Shapley value of game v and





for all i 2 N.
In fact, this property carries over to all players as is seen in Theorem 3.2.








11Proof. It is readily shown that f(v) := 1
2©(v) + 1
2E(v) satis¯es the four characterizing
properties: e±ciency, symmetry, quasi dummy property and additivity.
We now provide an alternative characterization for the consensus value by means of the
transfer property.
The transfer property (Dubey (1975)) in some sense substitutes for additivity. It is
de¯ned as follows. For any two games v;w 2 TUN, we ¯rst de¯ne the games (v _ w)
and (v ^ w) by (v _ w)(S) = maxfv(S);w(S)g and (v ^ w)(S) = minfv(S);w(S)g for all
S µ N. Let f : TUN ¡! RN be a solution concept on the class of TU games. Then, f
satis¯es the transfer property if f(v _ w) + f(v ^ w) = f(v) + f(w) for all v;w 2 TUN.
Dubey (1975) characterized the Shapley value as the unique value on the class of monotonic
simple games satisfying e±ciency, symmetry, the dummy property, and transfer property.
Feltkamp (1995) generalized this result to the class of all TU games. More speci¯cally, the
Shapley value is the unique value on the class of TU games satisfying e±ciency, symmetry,
the dummy property and the transfer property (cf. Feltkamp (1995, p.134, Theorem 9.1.5)).
We now have an alternative characterization of the consensus value for TU games.
Theorem 3.3 The consensus value is the only one-point solution on the class of TU games
that satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and the transfer property.
Proof. As is well known, a solution concept f : TUN ¡! RN satisfying additivity on
TUN also satis¯es the transfer property on TUN. Therefore, the consensus value satis¯es
the transfer property. In addition, requiring a solution concept f : TUN ¡! RN to satisfy
e±ciency, symmetry, and the quasi dummy property, it easily follows that f is uniquely
determined for (multiples of) unanimity games. Moreover, by Feltkamp (1995, Lemma
9.1.4), it also follows that if the solution concept f satis¯es the transfer property too, it is
uniquely determined for any game in TUN.
4 A generalization of the consensus value
By relaxing the way of sharing remainders, we get a generalization of the consensus value:
the generalized consensus value.
Let v 2 TUN. We de¯ne the generalized remainder, with respect to an order ¾ 2 ¦(N)





v(N) if k = jNj
v(S¾




k) ¡ v(f¾(k + 1)g)
¢
if k 2 f1;:::;jNj ¡ 1g
12Correspondingly, the individual generalized remainder vector s¾












if k 2 f2;:::;jNjg
rµ(S¾
1) if k = 1
De¯nition 4.1 For every v 2 TUN and µ 2 [0;1], the generalized consensus value °µ(v)









Note that the consensus value corresponds to the case µ = 1
2.
As mentioned in Section 3, dependent on the degree to which individualism or col-
lectivism is preferred by society, the dummy property can be generalized. De¯ning the









for all v 2 TUN and every dummy player i 2 N with
respect to v, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2 (a) The generalized consensus value °µ is the unique one-point solution
concept on TUN that satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the µ-dummy property and additivity.
(b) For any v 2 TUN, it holds that
°µ(v) = µ©(v) + (1 ¡ µ)E(v):
(c) The generalized consensus value °µ is the unique function that satis¯es e±ciency,
symmetry, the µ-dummy property and the transfer property over the class of TU games.
The expression of the generalized consensus value as provided in part (b) of Theo-
rem 4.2 is in the same spirit as the so-called compound measures in the context of digraph
competitions (cf. Borm, van den Brink and Slikker (2002)).
Finally, we want to note that, in particular, for µ = 1, the generalized consensus value
is actually the Shapley value: the average serial remainder value turns to be the average
serial marginal contribution value. When µ = 0, the generalized consensus value equals to
the equal surplus solution.
Consequently, we have the following characterizations for the equal surplus solution.
Corollary 4.3 (a) The equal surplus solution E is the unique one-point solution concept
that satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the 0-dummy property and additivity.
(a) The equal surplus solution E is the unique one-point solution concept that satis¯es
e±ciency, symmetry, the 0-dummy property and transfer property.
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